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Chapter 2 of this FSR focuses on analysing developments in the Spanish banking 
sector and in the other financial intermediaries during 2020, a year in which the 
COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the financial system, albeit an 
impact which the economic policy response has largely cushioned. Thus, lending 
grew in Spain during the year and NPLs continued to decline. However, this was largely 
conditioned by the credit support schemes implemented (State guarantees and loan 
moratoria), which will need to be monitored closely. The impact of the pandemic on 
banking activity and the economic outlook, along with several extraordinary 
adjustments, gave rise to negative profitability in the banking sector in 2020, albeit 
unevenly across institutions. However, this unfavourable profitability performance did 
not translate into a worsening of the sector’s solvency, and capital ratios increased, 
underpinned in part by the reform of European capital requirements and by the 
authorities’ recommendation on dividend distribution restrictions. As regards the non-
bank financial sector, the net flows contributed to investment funds stabilised in the 
second half of the year, although these intermediaries were exposed to the risk of 
abrupt changes in financial market conditions. Interconnections between financial 
sub-sectors through common holdings of marketable securities, particularly those on 
the edge of investment grade, are a potential propagation channel for this risk.
2.1 Deposit institutions




the	year.	The year-on-year growth rate stood at 3.5%,1 although credit expansion 
was particularly strong in Q2, coinciding with heightened deployment of the ICO 
guarantee scheme for loans to firms (see Chart 2.1).2 This is the first time bank 
lending has grown in Spain since 2008, reflecting the banking sector’s ability to meet 
households’ and firms’ liquidity needs and the effect of the economic policy measures 
1	 	In	December	2020	growth	was	affected	by	a	corporate	transaction	consisting	of	the	absorption	of	an	SLI	into	a	
significant	deposit	institution	(DI).	In	any	event,	excluding	this	transaction,	growth	for	2020	as	a	whole	was	2,9%.
2  Royal Decree-Law	8/2020 of 17 March 2020 approved a State guarantee facility of up to €100 billion to help 
preserve employment and mitigate the economic effects of the health crisis. Royal Decree-Law	25/2020 approved 
a	second	facility	to	cover	funding	needs	for	new	investments.	Royal Decree-Law	34/2020 extended the application 
deadlines and improved the conditions of the previously approved guarantee facilities.
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taken to mitigate the negative effects of the crisis, in particular the credit support 
schemes (ICO guarantees and moratoria).
Total	 new	 lending	 granted	 in	 2020	 to	 households	 and	 to	 non-financial	
corporations	 (NFCs)	and	sole	proprietors	exceeded	 that	granted	 in	2019	by	
4.1%. However, behaviour was mixed: lending to NFCs and sole proprietors increased 
by 6.6% and that to households decreased by 5.6%. The volume of credit drawn in 
transactions linked to the ICO guarantee facilities represented 18% of total new 
lending granted by deposit institutions in Spain in 2020 (see Chart 2.1) and 34% of 
new lending granted to NFCs and sole proprietors. These developments have also 
been sustained more broadly by the raft of fiscal and monetary measures adopted 
in response to the COVID-19 crisis.
Non-performing	loans	to	the	resident	private	sector	continued	to	decrease	in	
2020,	 albeit	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 than	 in	 previous	 years. The stock of problem 
assets of this kind declined by 3.8% year-on-year (see Chart 2.2), compared with the 
decreases recorded in 2018 (-29.1%) and 2019 (-19.1%). The severe contraction of 
the Spanish economy as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic explains the worse 
relative performance of NPLs in the past year, with a rebound in Q2 followed by a 
return to the downward path associated with certain sales of these portfolios. 
The stock of credit of deposit institutions (DIs) to the private sector resident in Spain grew by 3.5% in 2020, although there was some 
sluggishness in H2. The volume of new credit granted was 4.1% higher than in 2019. Business lending with ICO guarantees accounted for 
34% of the credit drawn down on new loans to non-financial corporations and sole proprietors, thus critically contributing to preventing the 
contraction of lending to the private sector.
THE SUPPORT MEASURES HAVE SUSTAINED THE FLOW OF NEW CREDIT IN 2020, THUS CONTRIBUTING TO THE GROWTH 
OF THE STOCK IN THE YEAR, WHICH WAS CONCENTRATED IN Q2
Chart 2.1
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The	 net	 flow	 of	 NPLs	 was	 less	 negative	 than	 in	 the	 previous	 year,	 with	
comparable	 rates	 of	 NPL	 inflows	 and	 outflows. Inflows into NPLs decreased 
slightly with respect to 2019 but recoveries and outflows to write-offs also declined. 
This, together with fewer asset sale transactions, has given stability to the balance 
of NPLs. In contrast with the two previous economic crises in Spain, when NPLs 
rose strongly during the first year, with a smaller economic contraction, to date an 
increase in these problem assets has not been recorded during the current crisis 
(see Chart 2.2). It is highly likely that there will be a significant increase in new NPLs 
in the coming quarters that outflows will be unable to offset. 
The	NPL	 ratio	also	continued	 to	decline,	once	again	more	moderately	 than	 in	
recent	 years,	 confirming	 the	 change	 in	 its	 determinants	 observed	 since	mid-
2020. The moderate fall in the balance of NPLs in the numerator of the ratio, along with 
the aforementioned growth of loans in the denominator, caused the NPL ratio to continue 
its downward trend of recent years, to stand at 4.4% (0.4 pp less than in December 
2019). If the current pace of growth of lending does not hold, or NPLs increase owing to 
the worsening of economic agents’ financial conditions, the NPL ratio could rise in the 
coming months, especially in the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic.
The	economic	policy	support	measures	adopted	to	mitigate	the	negative	effects	
of	the	pandemic	would	largely	explain	the	lower	sensitivity	of	NPLs	to	changes	in	
activity. As discussed in Chapter 1, measures such as furlough schemes, tax moratoria 
and public guarantee and debt moratoria schemes are specifically designed to improve 
firms’ ability to pay and have proved to be effective to date. However, part of the effects 
of these measures could be merely temporary, and, as mentioned earlier, if economic 
activity remains stalled for some time, especially in certain sectors, this would ultimately 
give rise to greater increases in NPLs owing to the worsening of firms’ and households’ 
solvency over the coming quarters. This deterioration of the credit portfolio could 
condition the supply of credit by banks, impacting the strength of the recovery. In this 
connection, ongoing monitoring of exposures linked to the public guarantee scheme for 
loans to firms (see Box 2.1) and the debt moratoria scheme (see Box 2.2) is necessary to 
measure the scope and duration of their mitigating effects. 
There	were	also	some	signs	of	credit	quality	impairment,	of	varying	intensity,	
in	the	performance	of	refinanced	and	Stage	2	 loans,	and	in	non-performing	
loans	in	specific	segments. While forborne loans continued to fall year-on-year in 
2020, these declines have been much more moderate since the onset of the 
pandemic, possibly indicating banks’ greater recourse to them to mitigate payment 
difficulties encountered by some borrowers. Stage 2 loans, which signal impairment 
more specifically, increased substantially in 2020, especially in Q4.3 Also notable is 
the pick-up in the growth of non-performance in the consumer portfolio in 2020.
3	 	Pursuant	to	Circular	4/2017,	a	loan	is	classified	as	a	Stage	2	exposure	when	credit	risk	has	increased	significantly	
since initial recognition, even though no event of default has occurred.
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In	2020	Spanish	deposit	institutions	increased	their	total	volume	of	assets	at	
consolidated	level	by	3.5%,	despite	the	drop	in	the	stock	of	loans	to	the	private	
sector (see Annex 1). The decline in credit to the private sector was a consequence 
of the overall decrease for the foreign countries where Spanish deposit institutions 
have a significant presence, not for lending in Spain, which has expanded. In 
particular, financial assets abroad (which account for one half of consolidated 
NPLs decreased less than in prior years owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which translated into fewer recoveries that hardly 
offset the inflow of new NPLs. Compared with past crises, which affected non-performing assets more rapidly, in the current crisis this impact 
is being cushioned by the measures adopted to mitigate the effects of the pandemic. Also, the NPL ratio continued to decline, also owing to 
the growth observed in credit. However, the rate of growth of forbearance slowed and Stage 2 loans and non-performance in specific 
segments, such as consumption, increased substantially, signalling the possibility of a future increase in non-performing loans.
NPLS MODERATED THEIR FALL WITH RESPECT TO OTHER YEARS, AND THE NPL RATIO CONTINUED TO DECLINE OWING
TO THE GROWTH OF CREDIT, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME EARLY SIGNS OF IMPAIRMENT
Chart 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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financial assets) decreased by 4.8% in 2020 (compared with a 9.2% increase one 
year ago), in part owing to decisions to divest in certain countries adopted by some 
banks and to exchange rate developments. 
The	main	Spanish	deposit	institutions’	business	abroad	was	adversely	affected	
by	 the	 COVID-19	 pandemic,	 conditioned	 by	 the	 depreciation	 of	 currencies	
other	than	the	euro,	in	particular	emerging	market	currencies. Lending volume 
in the United Kingdom (the main country where Spanish deposit institutions operate) 
was less affected than in Mexico, Brazil and Turkey, in part owing to the greater 
depreciation of their currencies in the past year. In fact, these three countries 
recorded lending volume increases in local currency, which, however, did not offset 
the negative effect of the depreciations. The strong fall in lending in the United States 
was the result of the divestment decision made by one of the main Spanish deposit 
institutions, with its consequent reclassification to non-current assets held for sale. 
The NPL ratio declined in the main countries, except in Mexico (see Chart 2.3.1), 
where it stood at 2.6% as at December 2020, far lower than the 6.4% posted in 
Turkey. Chart 2.3.2 shows that despite the severity of the negative impact caused by 
COVID-19 in most of the countries where Spanish deposit institutions are present, 
The volume of credit in the main emerging countries in which Spanish deposit institutions are present fell in the past year owing to the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic and to the depreciation of their currencies against the euro. Meanwhile, it grew in the United Kingdom. The fall in 
the United States resulted from the divestment decision adopted by one of Spain'a main banks. However, if the exchange rate effect is not 
taken into account, year-on-year credit growth and, in general, a positive relationship between the year-on-year rate of change in credit and 
estimated GDP growth are observed, although with differing dynamics depending on the credit support measures adopted by the different 
countries. The NPL ratio has declined in all significant countries, except in the United Kingdom and, especially, in Mexico.
THE VOLUME OF CREDIT ABROAD OF SPAIN'S MAIN DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS HAS BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE
COVID-19 PANDEMIC, PARTIAL DIVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE APPRECIATION OF THE EURO. HOWEVER,
THE CREDIT SUPPORT PROGRAMMES HAVE COUNTERED THESE IMPACTS IN PART
Chart 2.3
SOURCES: Banco de España and IMF (April 2021 WEO).
a The data in the panels refer to the four main Spanish banking groups with significant international activity.
b Credit rate of change in constant euros, adjusted by year-on-year change in exchange rate (i.e.: rate of change in credit = [credit Dec-20 x (exr €/currency Dec-20 
/ exr €/currency Dec-19)] / credit Dec-19 – 1).
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the measures adopted to counter its adverse effects4 have driven up the volume of 
lending, with positive year-on-year rates of change being recorded in local currency. In 
many countries, this greater buoyancy of credit has been linked to the approval of support 
schemes (for instance, Mexico did not adopt measures to promote lending and credit 
growth was lower than in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Brazil and Turkey).
Spanish banks have increased their sovereign exposures at consolidated 
level,	although	to	a	lesser	extent	than	in	previous	crises	and	than	the	average	
of	European	banks.	The increase in public debt issuance to defray the fiscal cost 
of the measures taken to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic was reflected in an uneven 
change in the sovereign exposures of European banks. While these grew by 2.5% in 
year-on-year terms for Spanish banks as at December 2020, this growth reached 
12.1% for French banks (see Chart  4.1). German banks reduced their sovereign 
exposure by 3.7% in 2020. As a percentage of total assets, Spanish banks’ sovereign 
exposures declined by 0.2 pp in 2020, similar to the European average reduction 
(-0.3 pp). Spanish banks’ exposure to sovereign debt stood at 13% of total assets in 
4  See Box 2.1 Effects of the pandemic on the international banking systems most relevant to Spain, in the Autumn 2020 FSR.
As at December 2020 the exposure to sovereign debt represented 12.5% of total assets at European level. In Spain, the weight was 13%, 
slightly above the European average and only exceeded by Italy (16.8%). The volume of sovereign exposure varied unevenly across the 
largest European countries' banks, from -3.7% in Germany to 12.1% in France. The proportion of debt issued by European banks' own home 
country was 51.3% of the total sovereign exposure. The weight of Spain's domestic sovereign exposure (51.8%) was similar to the European 
average, and to that of countries such as France (53.3%) and the Netherlands (50.5%).
THE INCREASE IN GOVERNMENT DEBT ISSUANCE TO FINANCE MEASURES TO TACKLE COVID-19 WAS REFLECTED 
IN THE GROWTH OF EUROPEAN BANKS' GOVERNMENT DEBT HOLDINGS
Chart 2.4
SOURCE: EBA.
a The data for Spain are shown in red and those for the United Kingom in yellow.
b The EBA data include Iceland. From 2020 Q1 aggregate data for the EU no longer include figures from UK banks and include data from UK bank 
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December 2020, in line with the average for European banks. European banks’ 
sovereign exposures are concentrated in bonds issued by their own country, which 
on average accounted for 51.3% of the total sovereign exposure (see Chart 2.4.2).
Liquidity and financing conditions
Purchase	programs	and,	to	a	 lesser	extent,	refinancing	operations	explain	
the	expansion	of	the	Eurosystem’s	balance	sheet	and	the	liquidity	maintained	
by	 banks (see Chart 2.5). The balance of asset purchase programmes has 
increased by €467 billion since end-October 2020, the date of the last FSR, to 
€3,985  billion,5 driven by the expansion of the pandemic emergency purchase 
programme (PEPP) announced in December 2020.6 European banks have continued 
to have recourse to the Eurosystem’s refinancing operations (TLTRO III) to obtain 
liquidity. Operations alloted in the latest TLTRO III tender7 amounted to €331 billion, 
up from €50 billion allotted in December 2020, with a net increase in the liquidity 
obtained by banks through this channel of €353  billion after these latest two 
tenders.8 Overall, European banks continue to have high liquidity levels, up 
€833 billion since the cut-off date of the last FSR. 
These	 high	 liquidity	 volumes,	 along	 with	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 favourable	
funding	conditions	for	banks	and	the	expansion	of	the	PEPP,	have	contributed	
to	bringing	money	market	interest	rates	down	to	record	lows (see Chart 2.5.2). 
The euro short-term rate (€STR)9 has declined gradually, currently standing below 
the pre-pandemic levels (around -55 bp), very far from its highs in April. Similarly, the 
€STR trading volume has declined from its highs, stabilising at levels close to those 
recorded before March. It has also been observed that money market transactions 
with very short (overnight) maturities have gained weight over those with longer-term 
maturities since the beginning of the crisis.
European	banks’	 access	 to	 the	Eurosystem’s	 refinancing	operations	 –	with	
very	 favourable	 conditions	 –	 has	 improved	 their	 interbank	 funding	 costs,	
which are expected to remain low over a prolonged period. The expected 
interbank funding spread, calculated as the difference between expectations for 
EURIBOR and for risk-free interest rates, as determined by the OIS curve, provides 
5	 	Data	updated	as	at	20/4/21.
6  As a result of the decision of the Governing Council of the ECB of 10 December 2020 to expand the PEPP 
envelope to €1.85 trillion at least until March 2022. 
7	 The	dates	of	the	latest	two	tenders	were	16	December	2020	and	24	March	2021	respectively.	




each business day by the ECB based on the information provided by the 48 euro area MMSR reporting banks.
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an indicator of market expectations regarding changes in interbank funding costs.10 
This spread narrowed substantially during the second half of 2020 as a result of the 
10	 	This	indicator	is	calculated	based	on	the	work	carried	out	by	Jondeau	et	al.	(2020). It is calculated as the 3-month 
EURIBOR-OIS	forward	rate	spread:	FF=	Feuribor3,3 - FOIS3,3,	where	Feuribor3,3	represents	the	3-month	forward	rate	for	
3-month EURIBOR and FOIS3	the	forward	rate	based	on	the	overnight	index	swap	(OIS)	curve	with	the	same	time	
horizon.	The	following	derivatives	are	used	as	a	reference	for	EURIBOR:	a)	Forward	Rate	Agreements	(FRAs)	for	
between	1	 and	12	months,	 and	b)	 Interest	Rate	Swaps	 (IRS)	 for	 between	1	 and	10	 years,	where	 3-month	
EURIBOR is the underlying rate. 
Money market interest rates are at historic lows as a result of excess liquidity and the latest monetary policy measures adopted. Also, the 
Eurosystem's financing operations have contributed to a notable improvement in banks' financing conditions, which are expected to remain 
at low levels over a prolonged period. Borrowing costs on the wholesale market also declined in 2020 as a result of these measures.
THE ECB'S MONETARY POLICY HAS LED TO A RISE IN EXCESS LIQUIDITY, TO RECORD HIGHS, CONTRIBUTING TO AN
EASING OF FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Chart 2.5
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a The solid lines show the spread between the three-month forward rate for 3-month Euribor and the forward rate based on the OIS curve for 
a three-month period, and the levels of these two rates, while the broken lines show the projections for the forward Euribor and OIS curves, 
respectively, and the spread between them.
b Only one issuance of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) was carried out in 2019. The cost for Spanish banks' issues is shown based on the 
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liquidity injection received by banks through TLTRO III operations since June and the 
decision to maintain the interest rate on these operations at low levels for longer.11 
Despite an expected increase in this indicator in 2021-2022, explained by EURIBOR 
recovery expectations and the continuation of the risk-free interest rate level, it would 
remain moderate and comparable with the pre-crisis level (see Chart 2.5).
The	cost	of	new	issues	denominated	in	euro	has	decreased	or	held	steady	for	
all	debt	instruments	in	the	wholesale	funding	market. The decrease is particularly 
noteworthy in the case of bonds meeting the Tier II capital requirements and of 




increased somewhat. The average cost of private sector deposits remains at 
minimum levels, while the average cost of debt on the liability side of the balance 
sheet has increased minimally. In the individual balance sheet of business in Spain 
the volume of private sector deposits increased in 2020 (by 9% year-on-year), 
possibly driven by households’ and firms’ precautionary reasons, yet their weight in 
total funding decreased by 1.2  pp. The weight of private sector deposits in the 
consolidated balance sheet also fell by 0.3 pp in 2020, to stand at 66.8% of total 
funding (deposits and debt issuance on the balance sheet). In contrast, the weight 
of deposits received from central banks in total consolidated funding increased by 
4.4 pp compared with December 2019, standing at 10.6% at December 2020. This 
change was prompted by the accommodative monetary policy adopted by the ECB 
and other central banks. Box 2.3 conducts a preliminary analysis of the consequences 
of the possible introduction of a digital euro for financial stability and monetary 
policy, where banks’ deposit-taking activity plays a key role.




on	the	profit	recorded	in	2019. This translates into a return on assets (ROA) of 
-0.21% (a fall of 72 bp from 0.51% in 2019) and a return on equity (ROE) of -3.1% 
(a fall of 10 pp from 6.9% recorded a year earlier).
11  Decision of the ECB Governing Council meeting of 10 December 2020. The interest rate applied to TLTRO III 
remains	50	bp	below	the	MRO	rate	until	23	June	2022.	For	banks	meeting	certain	criteria	the	rate	may	be	up	to	
50	bp	below	the	average	deposit	facility	rate.




extraordinary	 items,	 the	 sector’s	 profitability	 would	 be	 positive,	 with	 ROA	
standing	at	0.3%	and	ROE	at	4.3%. In particular, as noted in the previous FSR, the 
two largest banks recorded adjustments to their goodwill for an amount in excess of 
€12 billion in the first half of 2020, along with other adjustments, such as those linked 
to tax assets. In addition, as a result of the approval of its merger, another bank 
recorded an adjustment to fair value for an amount exceeding €5.5 billion in its year-
end accounts, in accordance with accounting standards.12 These negative 
adjustments were partially offset by positive extraordinary adjustments exceeding 




decreased	substantially	with	respect	to	the	previous	year. Chart 2.6 shows how, 
12  International Financial Reporting Standard 5 (IFRS 5) “Non-current assets held for sale and discontinued 
operations”,	which	indicates	that	assets	meeting	the	requirements	for	classification	as	held	for	sale	should	be	
valued	at	the	lower	of	carrying	amount	and	fair	value	less	costs	to	sell.
As a result of the impact of the pandemic on banking activity and on the worsening of the economic outlook, the decrease in profit in 2020 was 
widespread among banks. However, the negative net accounting profits of the largest banks are influenced by the appreciation of the euro, the 
negative extraordinary adjustments relating to goodwill and deferred tax assets and the accounting adjustments linked to merger processes.
MOST BANKS HAVE REDUCED THEIR NET PROFIT IN 2020 WITH RESPECT TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR
Chart 2.6
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The charts show the ROA and ROE density functions for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by the amount of average total assets and average equity, 
respectively. The density function is approximated by means of a kernel estimator, which enables non-parametric estimation and provides a continuous, 
smoothed graphic representation of the function. The vertical lines indicate the ROA and the ROE of the Spanish banking system as a whole in 2019 (blue) 
and 2020 (red).
b The negative mode closest to zero relates to large significant institutions whose results in 2020 are largely explained by negative extraordinary 
adjustments. The most extreme mode relates to another significant institution with accounting adjustments linked to a merger process.
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
1  DISTRIBUTION OF THE ROA (a) (b)
-50 -30 -10 10 30 50
2  DISTRIBUTION OF THE ROE (a) (b)
 DECEMBER 2019  DECEMBER 2020
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 65 Financial Stability REPORt. SPRinG 2021  2. RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
both for the ROA and the ROE, the distribution of profit in 2020 shifted significantly 
towards more negative values. Along the same lines, Chart 2.7.1 shows that most 
banks (more than three quarters of the sector) recorded a decline in net profit from 
the previous year, while their average total assets (ATAs) increased. For the system 
as a whole, ATAs increased by more than 4% year-on-year in 2020, while average 
equity decreased by more than 3%.
The	impact	of	the	pandemic	on	net	interest	income	and	fees	and	commissions	
resulted	 in	both	 items	posting	year-on-year	declines	of	around	10%	in	2020 
(see Annex 2). Part of this decrease in net interest income and net commissions is 
due to currency depreciation in the main countries in which Spanish banks have a 
significant presence, especially emerging countries. 
Gains	on	 financial	assets	and	 liabilities	and	operating	expenses	were	 the	
only	 items	 improving	 significantly	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 previous	 year.	 The	
decline	 in	 operating	 expenses	 was	 particularly	 notable (see Chart 2.7.2). 
Breaking the trend of recent years, gains on financial assets and liabilities 
increased by 35% in 2020, driven by the sale of securities portfolios accumulating 
In 2020 most institutions have recorded a fall in net income, while their ATAs have increased. The main determinants of the sharp fall in profits 
include the decrease in net interest income and in fees and commissions, the increase in impairment losses and the negative extraordinary 
adjustments (goodwill, tax assets and the deterioration in value arising from accounting reclassification, included in other items), while the increase 
in results on financial assets and liabilities and, in particular, the decline in operating expenses, contribute to improving income for the year.
THE IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC ON BANKING ACTIVITY AND THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK HAS SEVERELY AFFECTED 
PROFITABILITY IN THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR
Chart 2.7
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) colour of the bars indicates a negative (positive) contribution of the item concerned to the change in consolidated profit in December 
2020 with respect to December 2019. The black diamonds show the ROA excluding both the adjustments to goodwill recorded in 2019 (-€2.8 billion) 
and 2020 (-€12.2 billion) and the deferred tax asset adjustment recorded in 2020 (-€2.5 billion). The pink diamond shows the ROA in 2020 excluding, 
in addition to the aforementioned adjustments, the deterioration in value arising from accounting reclassification (-€5.6 billion) and the extraordinary 
positive results recorded in 2020 (€1.2 billion).
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capital gains. This helped limit to some extent the adverse effects on gross 
income, which, however, declined by 5.1% year-on-year. Operating expenses 
decreased by more than 10%, in part owing to a lower contribution of extraordinary 
restructuring costs. This notable decline caused operating income to increase 
slightly with respect to the previous year (0.7%). As with net interest income and 
fees and commissions, the performance of other income and operating expense 
headings is at least partly explained by currency depreciation in the countries 
where Spanish banks have a significant presence, especially in the case of 
emerging countries (see Chart 2.3).
Operating	income	from	activity	in	Spain	has	been	more	resilient	to	the	impact	
of	the	pandemic. Recurrent banking activity was less affected in business in Spain 
than in total business in 2020. Thus, net interest income fell by barely 0.7% between 
December 2019 and December 2020 and fees and commissions increased by 1.4% 
in the same period. Gross income decreased by 1.9%, but since the decline in 
operating expenses was greater (-5.8%), the performance of operating income was 
ultimately positive. 
Impairment	losses	increased	significantly	in	the	year,	especially	in	the	first	six	
months. As a result of the potential negative impact of the COVID19 pandemic on 
credit quality, financial asset impairment losses increased by more than 50%, giving 
rise to the recording of provisions that were €8.7 billion higher in 2020 than in 2019. 
However, most of this increase was posted in the first half of the year ( the increase 
in provisions between June 2020 and June 2019 was already €7.6 billion), with the 
pace of provisions slowing significantly from June. Impairment losses in the business 
in Spain account for more than 40% of total provisions and in this case the pace of 
provisioning in the second half of the year, although somewhat slower, remained 




The provisions recorded in 2020 for the business in Spain amount to 21.5% of those 
estimated for 2020-2022 under the Banco de España FLESB framework for stress 
testing on the assumption of a moderate impact of the support measures, and to 
33.6% on the assumption of a medium impact of the support measures13 (see Box 2.1). 
In any case, significant dispersion between banks was observed in the provisioning 
effort made (see Chart 2.8).14
13  Under the moderate impact assumption, the quality of ICO-guaranteed loans is average for the portfolio of loans 
to	business,	while	under	the	medium	impact	assumption,	 the	quality	 is	at	a	midpoint	between	the	moderate	
impact	assumption	and	a	maximum	impact	assumption	where	the	guarantee	schemes	are	used	in	full	to	absorb	
the	worst	quality	credit	(for	further	details,	see Chapter 2 of the Autumn 2020 FSR of the Banco de España.
14  See also Box	5	of	the	ECB’s	Financial	Stability	Review,	November	2020,	where	different	explanatory	factors	of	the	
heterogeneity	across	banks	regarding	the	increase	in	their	provisions	owing	to	the	pandemic	are	discussed.	
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in the largest European economies there is to some extent a positive 
relationship	between	the	the	falls	in	activity	and	the	credit	risk	provisioning	
effort.15 In general, it is observed that the countries which have resorted more 
heavily to these support measures tend to be those which have endured a sharper 
contraction. This suggests that governments whose economies are more vulnerable 
to the pandemic have fostered more ambitious plans (see Chart 2.8). Credit 
institutions also seem to have made a greater provisioning effort in jurisdictions 
15	 	The	measure	used	to	reflect	the	scale	of	the	provisions	is	the	cost	of	risk	reported	in	the	EBA Risk Dashboard 
2020Q4.
The pace of impairment provisioning in 2020 would broadly have been adequate to absorb the credit losses estimated in the FLESB stress 
test exercise for the 2020-2022 horizon, but the effort should be maintained over time in order to fully absorb the estimated credit impairment 
for the period. There is, however, heterogeneity across banks and uncertainty about the medium-term impact of the support measures 
implemented, mainly the ICO credit guarantees, and about the macroeconomic scenario. Among the main European countries, a negative 
relationship was observed in 2020 between the performance of GDP and the intensity of provisions, with limited change in the intensity of 
the measures relating to GDP.
SPANISH INSTITUTIONSSHOULD MAINTAIN THEIR PROVISIONING EFFORT TO ABSORB THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS
ON CREDIT QUALITY, THE SCALE OF WHICH HAS BEEN CONDITIONED IN 2020 BY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND BY THE
SCOPE OF THE SUPPORT MEASURES
Chart 2.8
SOURCES: Banco de España and ESRB.
a The numerator of the ratios considers the provisions recorded by Spanish banks for credit risk for business in Spain in 2020. The denominator 
considers the required provisions estimated by the FLESB framework for the baseline scenario in the 2020-2022 horizon.The denominator 
considers two assumptions regarding the impact of the support measures (mainly the ICO guarantee scheme): moderate and medium. Under 
the moderate impact assumption, the quality of credit guaranteed by the ICO is similar to that of the portfolio of loans to business activities as 
a whole, while, under the medium impact assumption, quality is at the midpoint between the moderate impact assumption and the maximum 
impact assumption where guarantees are used in full to absorb the worst credit quality (see Chapter 2 of the Autumn 2020 FSR of the Banco de 
España) for further details). The chart shows the density function of such ratios for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by total credit volume. 
The density function is approximated by means of a kernel estimator, which enables non-parametric estimation and provides a continuous, 
smoothed graphic representation of the function. 
b Each dot represents an EU country. The dot's area is proportional to the instensity of provisioning recorded in 2020, estimated based on the 
measurement of cost of risk of the EBA's dashboard for December 2020. The X axis represents the fall in GDP during that year and the Y axis 
represents the volume of measures used in relation to GDP in 2019, in accordance with Special Feature of the ECB's Financial Stability Review, Autumn 
2020. The measures considered include direct tax transfers, furlough and similar schemes, tax and loan moratoria, use of public guarantees for 
bank credit and potential additional credit (not for credit already granted) resulting from the release of capital buffers and the effect of the reform of 
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recording larger GDP declines, which means that the measures might not have been 
sufficient to offset all the credit risk increase associated with this crisis.
At	European	level,	the	main	component	of	gross	income	in	the	banking	sector	
continued to be net interest income. According to the latest banking supervision 
statistics released by the ECB (December 2020), banks in the Netherlands and Spain 
were the most dependent on net interest income, which accounted for 77.9% and 
68.7%, respectively, of gross income, while for those in France and Germany it 
accounted for approximately 50% (see Chart 2.9.1), which is explained by the different 
business models of their largest banks. Spanish banks made the biggest recent effort 
among European banks in terms of seeking alternative sources of income through the 
growth of net fees and commissions (see Chart 2.9.2). However, this ratio shows a 
lower level in business in Spain (0.47%) than at consolidated level (0.6%), the first figure 
being lower than the average for European banks at consolidated level (0.58%), and the 
second being higher, owing to the contribution of business abroad. The adaptation of 
its business model in areas where this item weighs less than average provides Spanish 
banks with greater potential for further growth in this source of income.
Against	 this	 backdrop,	 the	 weight	 of	 business	 abroad	 in	 Spanish	 deposit	
institutions’	ordinary	profit	has	increased. Thus, without taking into account the 
Despite the growing weight of net fees and commissions in total assets as an additional source of income in recent years, net interest income 
continues to be the main source of gross margin for the main European countries, although there are differences across countries. However, 
this growing trend has halted as a result of the COVID-19 crisis.
NET INTEREST INCOME IS THE MAIN COMPONENT OF GROSS INCOME FOR EUROPEAN BANKS, ALTHOUGH A GROWING
WEIGHT OF NET FEES AND COMMISSIONS AS A SOURCE OF INCOME WAS OBSERVED, WHICH WAS HALTED BY THE
COVID-19 CRISIS
Chart 2.9
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Includes the 19 Euro area member countries.
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adjustments made by Spain’s main banking groups to the goodwill of their subsidiaries 
in the United Kingdom and the United States, ordinary profit from business abroad 
accounted for over 80% of the total (see Chart 2.10.1). Business in Spain made a 
smaller contribution to the ordinary profit of Spain’s main banking groups as a result 
of the larger relative increase in impairment provisions in 2020 (see Chart 2.10.2). As 
discussed earlier, impairment losses in business in Spain represent a high proportion 
of total provisions in 2020. 
Solvency
In	2020,	despite	the	outbreak	of	the	pandemic,	the	CET1	ratio	of	the	Spanish	
banking	system	increased	by	71	basis	points	(bp),	to	13.3%. This increase was 
recorded in the second half of the year. The same trend, i.e. a rise in the ratios mainly 
Ordinary profit obtained abroad by deposit institutions with a strong international presence fell across the board (e.g. -31% in Brazil or -28% 
in Mexico), in part owing to currency depreciation in emerging countries, but its relative contribution to ordinary profitability at the 
consolidated level increased. This is explained by the larger fall in business in Spain (-50%), affected by relatively higher impairment losses 
than the average for the other countries. However, the smaller contribution to consolidated profit made by business abroad was on account 
of the goodwill adjustment at the subsidiaries in the United Kingdom and the United States. The extraordinary COVID-19-related provisions
were also concentrated in the first half of the year.




a The panel data refer to the four big Spanish banking groups with significant international activity.
b Ordinary attributable profit does not include impairment of goodwill or other adjustments (e.g. restructuring costs, adjustments for deferred taxes, 
etc.), and for Spain it does not include the contribution by the corporate centre.
c Ordinary attributable profit was affected by the appreciation of the euro, against the emerging currencies (i.e. Brazil, Turkey and Mexico) and against 
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in the second half of the year, was followed by the Tier 1 capital ratio and the total 
capital ratio, which stood at 14.7% and 16.8%, respectively (see Chart 2.11.1). The 
downturn in profitability did not lead to a negative adjustment of banks’ solvency, 
largely because negative extraordinary items (e.g. goodwill impairment) affect 
balance sheet items that are not counted towards banks’ prudential capital.
The	decrease	 in	 the	 risk-weighted	assets	 (RWAs)	of	 the	 largest	 institutions	
contributed	to	the	 increase	 in	the	solvency	ratios. Although prudential capital 
levels rose in 2020 in the numerators of the ratios for the banking sector as a whole 
(CET1 by 0.8%, Tier 1 capital by 1.4% and total capital by 1.9%) the decline in RWAs 
was more pronounced, nearly 5% in 2020 (see Chart 2.11.2). The fall in RWAs in the 
past year was largely due to the measures adopted by the authorities to mitigate the 
effects of the pandemic (guaranteed loans, the CRR quick fix, etc.) and to exchange 
rate effects in the two banking groups with the strongest international presence, 
thus partially offsetting the adverse effects of these exchange rate movements in the 
volume of CET1 denominated in euro.
The	increase	in	capital	levels	was	driven	by	the	authorities’	recommendation	
on	dividend	distribution	restrictions	and,	to	a	greater	extent,	by	the	CRR	quick	
fix.	Specifically, the CRR reform exempts part of banks’ investments in intangible 
fixed assets related to software from deduction. In addition, a further discount to risk 
weighting was added to credit to SMEs. Also, the prudential treatment of eligible 
income for solvency purposes results in it not being affected by the negative 
In 2020, the CET1 ratio increased by 72 bp to stand at 13.3% at the end of the year. The rise occurred in the second half the year and, 
although CET1 capital increased slightly, it was mainly a consequence of the decline in RWAs, partly due to currency depreciation. The Tier 1 
capital and total capital ratios also increased in 2020. The European quick fix and the prudential filters prevented the deterioration in 
profitability (due to negative extraordinary adjustments) from translating into a deterioration in solvency, and also contributed to the 
improvement in the ratios.
THE AGGREGATE CAPITAL RATIOS OF THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR INCREASED IN 2020 DESPITE THE PANDEMIC
Chart 2.11
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extraordinary items identified in the previous section and, therefore, the rest of 
profit generation contributes positively to the numerator’s performance. Chart 2.12.1 
shows that the increase in CET1 is widespread among banks (the same is true for 
the other two types of capital), while in the case of RWAs there are greater 
disparities, with increases and reductions. Thus, the decrease in the Spanish 
banking system’s aggregate RWAs in 2020 is due to the decline in most (10) of the 
(12) significant institutions supervised by the SSM while, for the rest of the system, 
RWAs broadly increased.
As	regards	the	composition	of	the	CET1	ratio,	capital	instruments	and	reserves	
together	 account	 for	 more	 than	 90%	 of	 the	 CET1	 ratio (see Chart  2.12.2). 
However, over the past year there was some change in the relative weights of these 
two items, with capital rising and reserves declining. As regards deductions, the 
decrease in those deriving from goodwill and tax assets is notable, as a consequence 
of the downward adjustment to the goodwill recorded by the two banks with the 
largest international presence discussed in the previous section.
Comparison of European banks in terms of solvency and profitability
The	 profitability	 of	 Spanish	 deposit	 institutions	 was	 lower,	 on	 average,	
compared	to	 the	rest	of	 the	European	banking	sector	 in	2020,	although	the	
A large portion of banks increased their CET1 during 2020, whereas negative and positive changes in RWAs were distributed more evenly. 
However, since the largest banks reduced their RWAs (partly as a result of currency depreciation), the aggregate volume of RWAs fell by 
almost 5% in 2020. Deductions associated with goodwill decreased owing to the significant impairment of this component in 2020.
WHEREAS MOST BANKS INCREASED THEIR CET1 IN 2020, CHANGES IN RWAs WERE DIVIDED EVENLY BETWEEN POSITIVE
AND NEGATIVE VALUES
Chart 2.12
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The dots above the bisector represent increases (decreases) in CET1 over the last year greater (smaller) than the increases (decreases) in RWAs and, 
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aforementioned	extraordinary	factors	could	be	conditioning	this	assessment.	
Chart 2.13.1 shows the European comparison of the ROE ratio based on the latest 
data published by the EBA at December 2020. The main Spanish banks reported a 
negative ROE (-3.9%%), well below the European average (2%) and countries such 
as France and the Netherlands (above 3%). Also, Italy’s and Germany’s main banks 
posted profitabilities close to zero. This behavior in 2020 contrasts with the higher 
than European average profitability of Spanish banks after the financial global 
financial crisis. The negative profitability for the Spanish banking sector has been 
marked, as mentioned earlier, by certain extraordinary items. If Spanish banks’ 
extraordinary profit is excluded, ROE in 2020 is more favourable (4.3%), although 
this is 3.7 pp lower than in 2019.16 
Analysing	solvency	 in	terms	of	RWAs,	Spanish	banks	ranked	last	among	the	
main	 European	 banks	 as	 at	 December	 2020,	 but	 they	were	 in	 line	with	 the	
European	average	in	terms	of	the	leverage	ratio. Spanish banks’ CET1 ratio as at 
that date stood at 12.9% (see Chart 2.13.2), 3 pp below the European average (15.9%). 
16	 	A	 rigorous	 comparison	with	 the	 results	 of	 other	 European	 banks	would	 require	 a	 comparable	 detail	 of	 the	
influence	of	these	extraordinary	items	on	their	results	for	2020.
The ROE of the main Spanish deposit institutions stood at -3.9% in December 2020 – considerably lower than the European average of 2% – 
reversing the trend of recent years. This lower ROE was heavily influenced by extraordinary negative adjustments such as those to the 
goodwill of the foreign subsidiaries of the two major banking groups. Similarly, the CET1 ratio of Spanish deposit institutions continues to be 
the lowest of the largest European countries. However, this ratio grew for Spanish banks in 2020, and even more so for the banks of the other 
main European countries, largely driven by the revision of the capital requirements regulation.
SPANISH DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS COMPARE UNFAVOURABLY WITH THE EUROPEAN BANKING SECTOR, AS A WHOLE,
IN TERMS OF PROFITABILITY AND THE CET1 RATIO
Chart 2.13
SOURCE: EBA.
a The charts show the data for Spain in red and that for the UK in yellow.
b Excluding extraordinary results, the ROE of Spanish banks was 4.3%, -3.7 pp lower than in 2019.
c The EBA data include Iceland. As from 2020 Q1, the EU aggregate data no longer include figures for UK banks but do include data of UK banks' 
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The positive across-the-board performance of this ratio in 2020 was underpinned 
for banks supervised by the SSM by the “quick fix”. It should be borne in mind that 
this difference with the European average, in the case of the solvency ratio in terms 
of RWAs or the CET1 ratio, was already observed before the COVID-19 crisis and it 
is due to greater asset density, in part owing to structural factors such as the greater 
use of the standardised approach by Spanish banks. In fact, if solvency is measured 
in terms of the leverage ratio, Spain’s significant institutions (5.8%) are in line with 
the European average and above those of the larger countries, except Italy.
2.1.3 Deposit institutions’ operational risks
In	recent	years,	the	impact	of	operational	risks	in	terms	of	losses	for	deposit	
institutions has declined. This is explained in part by the fall in customer complaints 
(particularly those relating to mortgage loans), which have sometimes been resolved 
through the courts against Spanish deposit institutions and, in certain cases, are still 
pending resolution (see Chart 2.14.1).17 However, other types of operational risk loss 
events have increased, particularly those relating to external fraud, which is in many 
17  See the Annual Claims Report of the Banco de España (2019) (full version available only in Spanish).
Operational risk losses fell significantly between 2015 and 2018, especially those relating to customers, products and business practices, 
but have stabilised in recent years. By contrast, the number of loss events has continued to rise, particularly external fraud-related loss 
OPERATIONAL RISK LOSSES HAVE FALLEN IN RECENT YEARS, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF EVENTS GREW
Chart 2.14
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cases associated with cybersecurity breaches, but their related operational risk 
losses have increased more moderately. The number of events relating to the 
implementation, delivery and management of processes has held relatively steady. 
Meanwhile, events relating to customers overall (i.e. beyond complaints), products 
and business practices have increased. These also account for a greater proportion 
of operational risk losses, although it has declined since 2015 (see Chart 2.14). 
Operational risk-weighted assets have also fallen, declining by 6.5% in the past year, 
mainly owing to the decrease in the sector’s net income and the lower equivalent 
value of the portion of income in foreign currency resulting from the depreciation of 
certain currencies, such as Latin American currencies, this being the main variable 
used to calculate operational risk capital requirements under the standardised 
approach generally used by Spanish banks.
2.2 non-bank financial sector and systemic interconnections
2.2.1 non-bank financial sector
Specialised lending institutions
Specialised	 lending	 institutions	 (SLIs)	 posted	 a	 strong	 decline	 in	 credit	
granted	in	2020	and	a	worsening	of	the	NPL	ratio. The outstanding balance of 
credit granted by SLIs in Spain amounted to €41.3 billion at December 2020, down 
18.9% from the previous year. If the impact of corporate transactions on the sector 
is excluded18 and only the performance of the SLIs existing in December 2020 is 
considered, their outstanding credit would have declined by 6.4% in the past year. 
In any event, this is a significant contraction compared with the rates observed in 
previous years, owing to the impact of the health crisis on consumer lending, which 
is the main source of business for SLIs (see Chart 2.15).
The	 poor	 performance	 of	 credit	 contributed	 to	 the	worsening	 of	 the	 NPL	
ratio	in	the	first	two	quarters	of	2020.	The increase, to 6.5% (0.9 pp more than 
in December 2019), was more subdued in the second part of the year. Yet the 
volume of non-performing loans is experiencing very significant growth, in line 
with the non-performing loans in deposit institutions’ consumer loan portfolios. 
And this despite the fact that borrowers have availed themselves of moratoria for 
significant amounts.
The	income	of	SLIs	also	worsened	substantially	in	the	past	year. In 2020 the 
income of SLIs decreased by 19% year-on-year, in contrast with the positive changes 
18  The absorption of a sizeable SLI by a deposit institution in 2020 accounted for approximately three quarters of 
the overall decline.
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observed in recent years. As they specialise in consumer credit, SLIs were able to 
obtain higher profitability than other institutions, as this is also a riskier business. As 
mentioned earlier, the pandemic impacted consumption more severely than other 
segments. Accordingly, net interest income on fees and commissions declined sharply 
during the year, explaining the fall in profit. As a result of the specialised nature of these 
institutions, both their income and their NPL ratios could experience additional 
impairment pressures over the coming quarters if the restrictions associated with the 
pandemic remain, particularly as regards portfolios under moratoria.
Investment funds
Despite	 the	negative	 impact	of	 the	COVID-19	pandemic	 in	2020	Q1,	 the	net	
assets	of	investment	funds	registered	in	Spain	had	nearly	recovered	their	pre-
pandemic	levels	at	end-2020. Investment funds’ assets declined by only 0.05% in 
2020, despite the 10.5% fall recorded in Q1. This aggregate performance conceals 
the fact that net assets declined at more than half of the funds registered in Spain, 
in particular at equity investment funds (see Chart 2.16.1), which were highly 
influenced by the negative effects of adverse changes in the prices of these types of 
assets in the wake of the pandemic. There is also some heterogeneity in the 
Specialised lending institutions (SLIs) have been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The credit extended by these specialists in 
consumer credit declined notably by 6.4% for the year as a whole. The NPL ratio was particularly hard hit in the first two quarters of the year, 
although this effect moderated subsequently, and the ratio ended the year slightly higher than twelve months earlier. As for income, the 
decline in net interest income and in fees was the result of a fall of 19% in annual profit compared with growth in previous years.
THE CREDIT GRANTED BY SLIs IN 2020 DECLINED NOTABLY, THEIR NPL RATIO ROSE MODERATELY AND THEIR INCOME
WAS HIT HARD BY THE PANDEMIC (a)
Chart 2.15
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The analysis was performed with the group of SLIs existing in December 2020 and excluded, therefore, the effects of M&A activity in recent years.
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contribution of the components of net subscriptions and profitability to the change 
in net assets, among both investment funds and investment fund categories. In 2021 
Q1, the net assets of investment funds registered in Spain increased (by 4.7% with 
respect to December 2020), in terms of both net subscriptions and profitability.
Capital	 inflows	 of	 investment	 funds	 in	 the	 euro	 area	 have	 increased	
substantially	 in	 recent	 months. Chart 2.16.2 shows the cumulative change in 
capital flows since early 2020 for a representative sample of investment funds from 
the main euro area countries. Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
significant net outflows were recorded, which reversed from mid-year in all the 
countries except Italy. The recovery picked up in the final stretch of the year, 
particularly in equity funds. This is consistent with the positive impact on this market 
of the news on the COVID-19 vaccines, which led to an increase in investors’ risk 
appetite. In the case of Spanish investment funds, the pattern of capital inflows and 
Following the recovery as from 2020 Q2, in December 2020 investment funds’ net assets reached a similar volume to that of the previous 
year, with a year-on-year rate of change of close to zero. However, the median value of the distribution of the rate of change in investment 
funds’ net assets stood in negative territory, especially in equity funds. In March 2020, with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, there 
were significant net capital outflows from the investment funds of certain European countries. However, in 2020 H2 and the beginning of 
2021, net capital inflows recovered in most European countries, especially in Ireland and France, with the exception of Italy.
AFTER THE INITIAL ADVERSE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, NET ASSETS AND THE NET CAPITAL INFLOWS 
OF INVESTMENT FUNDS RECOVERED ACROSS THE BOARD
Chart 2.16
SOURCES Inverco and Refinitiv.
a The “long-term fixed-income funds” category includes long-term fixed-income investment funds, mixed fixed-income funds, international fixed-income funds 
and international mixed fixed-income funds. The “equity funds” category includes equity investment funds, mixed equity funds, international equity funds and 
international mixed equity funds. The total includes the two previous categories together with hedge funds, short-term fixed income funds, monetary funds, 
passive management funds, absolute return funds, global funds and collateralised investment funds.
b The chart shows the density function of the rate of change in investment funds' net assets, weighted by the previous year's net assets. This density 
function is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous and 
smoothed graphical representation of that function.
c The components of the contribution to the change in investment funds' net assets (net subscriptions and profitability) show a correlation coefficient 
of 0.01 for the total and for the long-term fixed-income funds, and of 0.20 for the equity funds.
d Cumulative change in investment funds' net capital inflows and outflows, as a percentage of and in relation to the net assets of each country's funds 
on 15 January 2020, based on a representative sample of funds domiciled in euro area countries.
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outflows, in comparison with other European countries, is proving to be more 
stable in this crisis. Thus, there were lower outflows at the onset of the pandemic, 
as well as a lower pace of inflows during the recovery phase. This could be due to 
the high weight of retail investors in the capital of investment funds, whose net 
assets are a priori less sensitive to falls in returns and, in general, to bouts of 
market volatility19.
Pension funds and insurance companies
The	flows	of	net	contributions	to	pension	funds	increased	significantly	in	2020.	
Thus, although gross contributions remained at levels similar to those of the previous 
year, net contributions grew by more than 40%, particularly in the individual systems. 
This dynamic could be affected by the new tax framework applicable to pension 
funds. Pension plan assets increased by 1.8% year-on-year, also showing an 
expansive behaviour in the first quarter of 2021 (growth of 2.4% since December 
2020). The annual average rate of return on pension funds at December 2020 was 
0.7% and the long-term rate of return (25 years) was 3.4%.
The	 insurance	sector	 improved	 its	 solvency	and	profitability	 levels	 in	 2020,	
despite	the	outbreak	of	the	COVID-19	pandemic,	with	an	uneven	performance	
of	 the	 life	and	non-life	segments. The solvency capital requirement (SCR) ratio 
was 237.8%, compared with 237% in 2019, while the ROE increased from 13.5% in 
2019 to 14.9% in 2020. Premium income in the non-life sector grew slightly (1%) 
owing to the strength of health and multi-risk insurance, while life premiums posted 
a double-digit decrease, giving rise to an overall fall in premium income for the sector 
of 8.2%.20 This drop in income was more than offset by the fall in claims and operating 
expenses, which explains the sustained profitability.
2.2.2 banks’ interconnections with the non-bank financial system
The	 analysis	 of	 interconnections	 between	 the	 different	 components	 of	 the	
Spanish	financial	system	helps	to	identify	common	sources	of	risk,	which	could	
contribute	to	the	transmission	of	tensions	therein	in	the	event	that	the	risks	to	
stability	posed	by	the	current	crisis	materialise. For this purpose, we analyse in this 
section the credit ratings of common holdings – i.e. securities that form part of the 
portfolio of more than one financial sector – of financial sectors’ marketable securities 
19	 	As	regards	the	relationship	between	fund	performance	and	type	of	holder,	see	Javier	Gil-Bazo,	Peter	Hoffmann	
and Sergio Mayordomo, “Mutual Funding”,	The	Review	of	Financial	Studies,	Volume	33,	Issue	10.
20	 	Life	 insurance	may	 cover	 the	 risk	 of	 death	 and/or	 incorporate	 a	 savings	 component	 linked	 to	 the	 insured’s	
survival	(with	the	possibility	of	mixed	policies	combining	the	two	elements),	while	non-life	insurance	covers	a	wide	
range of risks (car, health, claims, home insurance, etc.). Data obtained from ICEA.
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portfolios in 2020 Q4.21 Specifically, these holdings are studied, focusing on securities 
issued by non-financial corporations, for banks, insurance companies, investment 
funds and resident pension funds. Marketable securities portfolios account for 24% of 
total assets in the banking sector and for around 80% of total assets in the resident 
non-bank financial (NBF) sectors mentioned above.22
The	main	risk	is	that	the	credit	ratings	of	certain	vulnerable	issuers	may	be	
downgraded,	possibly	 triggering	 fire	sales	and	 losses	 (realised	or	valuation	
losses)	 for	 banks	 and	 NBF	 sectors. Fire sales could be conducted by some 
financial intermediaries that can only invest in securities above a certain credit rating, 
or by agents, such as investment funds, that could face cash withdrawals in periods 
of stress.23 This could impair liquidity and cause abrupt falls in prices in several 
markets, which could be passed on from one financial sector to another given their 
exposure to the same issuers. To date, the measures adopted to alleviate the impact 
of the health crisis have contributed to temporarily mitigating economic agents’ 
credit risk. Similarly, the decisions adopted in the design of the ECB’s asset purchase 
programme have also mitigated the possible non-linear effects on prices of the 
downgrading of credit ratings.24 Also, credit rating agencies have revised their ratings 
less than in other crises. Nonetheless, numerous issuers, especially NFCs, are 
currently in a vulnerable situation, as suggested by the negative outlooks resulting 
from credit agencies’ analyses and, accordingly, their ratings could be downgraded 
in the event of a worsening or persistence of the economic situation.25 
In	 Spain,	more	 than	 50%	of	 each	 financial	 sector’s	 portfolio	 securities	 are	
classified	 as	 above	 investment	 grade	 (above	 BBB-	 and	 equivalent	 ratings).	
This	percentage	would	be	significantly	higher	if	only	fixed	income	assets	were	
considered. Banks and insurance companies have the highest percentages of 
securities in investment grade, with 66% and 80%, respectively, of their holdings 
above this rating. In the case of investment funds and pension funds, these 
percentages hover around 51% and 57%, respectively, given the greater volume of 
unrated securities in their portfolios. Nevertheless, analysing these two subsectors 
21	 	Marketable	securities	include	both	fixed-income	and	equity	instruments	and	may,	in	particular,	include	holdings	
in	the	capital	of	investment	funds.	Each	issuer’s	rating	at	a	specific	date	is	assigned	to	all	of	its	issued	securities.	
22  The banking sector’s marketable securities portfolio, valued at market prices, amounts to around €661 billion, 
while	the	NBF	sectors’	portfolios	are	much	smaller:	insurance	companies,	€276	billion;	investment	funds,	€263	
billion; and pension funds, €119 billion. 
23  See Section 2.2.2. of the Banco de España’s Autumn 2020 FSR or Rodríguez de Codes et al. (2020), The 
challenges associated with the use of agencies’ credit ratings in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, Section 4,	
Financial	Stability	Review,	Autumn	2020,	Issue	39.
24  In April 2020 the ECB’s Governing Council adopted certain measures to relax collateral eligibility requirements in 
financing	transactions	with	financial	institutions	which	included,	most	notably,	the	easing	of	the	conditions	for	the	




25  See Boxes 1 and 3 of Chapter	2	of	the	ECB’s	Financial	Stability	Review,	November	2020. 
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in more detail, the securities not classified as investment grade were concentrated 
in instruments without assigned rating at the end of last year, which represented 
44.5% and 39% of the total holdings respectively. Within these instruments without 
an assigned rating, holdings in the capital of other investment funds predominated 
(a percentage higher than 30% of the portfolio) which, due to their nature, are not 
subject to credit ratings in the way fixed income securities are. Conversely, the 
presence of fixed income instruments without an assigned rating was marginal.
The	weight	of	securities	holdings	classified	in	the	highest	categories	(from	A-	
to	 AAA+	 and	 equivalent	 ratings)	 is	 greater	 for	 insurance	 companies	 (60%),	
which	is	significantly	higher	than	for	investment	funds	(27%)	and	pension	funds	
and	banks	(35%). These figures largely reflect that banks and insurance companies 
have larger holdings of – mainly Spanish – government debt securities. Lastly, 
holdings bordering on investment grade, in the BBB range, make up between 20% to 
25% of portfolios for the NBF sectors and 31% for the banking sector. 
The	 ratings	 of	 securities	 held	 in	 common	 by	 the	 banking	 sector	 and	 NBF	
sectors are concentrated between a- and aaa+ (see Chart 2.17.1). The percentage 
of securities held in common by each pair of sectors26 varies only slightly with 
respect to the similar exercise conducted in 202027 and is particularly high in the 
case of NBF sector. The holdings held in common by banks and NBF sectors that 
are bordering on investment grade represent a relatively small percentage of the 
total bank portfolio, around 12%. The weight of securities bordering on investment 
grade in holdings held in common with other sectors is more significant for investment 
and pension funds (around 20%).
The	weight	of	unrated	holdings	in	investment	and	pension	fund	portfolios	was	
high	in	December	2020.	Specifically, nearly 40% of their holdings are unrated (29% 
in the banking sector and 16% in the insurance sector). This is also reflected in the 
percentage of holdings these two sectors have in common and which each of them 
has with insurance companies. However, leaving aside the participations in other 
funds that, as already indicated, exceed 30% of the portfolio, the holdings that have 
not been assessed by credit rating agencies are not subject to the risk of fire sales 
owing to possible rating downgrades. However, as they are unrated, their secondary 
markets are likely to be shallow, which would make them difficult to sell in the event 
of possible liquidity needs and could generate more downward pressure on prices 




amounts relating to these holdings are computed as common holdings.
27  See the Banco de España’s Spring 2020 Financial Stability Report.
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Banks’	holdings	of	bonds	or	shares	issued	by	NFCs	are	minimal,	around	4.5	%	
of	 their	 marketable	 securities	 portfolio,	 and	 lower	 than	 those	 of	 the	 NBF	
sectors. The weight of these corporate securities in the NBF sectors’ portfolios is 
higher (10% in the case of insurance companies and around 20% in that of investment 
funds and pension funds). Approximately 40% of corporate security holdings held 
by banks are securities issued by Spanish NFCs, while the percentage is lower for 
the NBF sectors, between 18% and 34%28. 
Investment	 funds	 and	 pension	 funds	 maintain	 the	 highest	 percentage	 of	
common	holdings	of	corporate	securities	relative	to	the	size	of	the	portfolio,	
between	12%	and	17%	for	each	sector (see Chart 2.17.2). Holdings on the edge of 
investment grade range between 4% and 6% of the portfolio of these two sub-
sectors. For banks and insurance companies, common holdings of corporate 
28  The data used in this analysis are grouped at sectoral level, but are not consolidated on an intra- or cross-
sectoral	basis.	This	means	that	NFCs	may	have	subsidiaries	classified	in	the	sectors	of	financial	intermediaries	
through	which	 they	are	financed	via	 the	 issuance	of	securities,	but	since	 the	consolidated	 information	 is	not	
available, these exposures are not included in the analysis as securities issued by NFCs.
Investment funds and pension funds hold a relatively high proportion of common holdings of securities issued by NFCs that are on the edge 
of investment grade and are, therefore, more vulnerable to the possibility of a worsening of the economic situation. By contrast, in the 
case of the banking sector and the insurance companies, these securities account for a low proportion of total portfolio.
COMMON HOLDINGS IN DIFFERENT FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES OF SECURITIES ON THE EDGE OF INVESTMENT GRADE ARE
IMPORTANT FOR INVESTMENT AND PENSION FUNDS
Chart 2.17
SOURCES: Securities Holding Statistics by Sector and Refinitiv.
a IF, IC, PF and B denote investment funds, insurance companies, pension funds and banks, respectively. Each sector has common holdings with other 
sectors, as shown by the different columns in the chart, which depict the common holdings between each sector pair. For instance, the first column 
on the left-hand side indicates that the common holdings between banks and investment funds make up 48% of the total banking sector portfolio; of 
these holdings, approximately 12% are investment grade (BBB+ to BBB-). The market value of the holdings reported by the institutions is taken 
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securities are lower, standing at 4% and 6.5%, respectively. Chart 2.17 shows that 
when securities other than corporate securities are excluded, the weight of common 
holdings declines significantly in magnitudes exceeding 30 pp of the total portfolio. 
This effect evidences the importance of other common exposures different from 
corporate securities (particularly government debt) as a possible channel for the 
transmission of market shocks to all the financial sectors.
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